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Governing
the Commons is a major contribution of an awkward truth for evolution and development of self-organisation and
self-governance of commons, natural resources and economic
development policy.

             
The awkward truth begins with an inflammation of concern about the depletion of natural resources. Ostrom expresses her concern
over governing the commons in process of solving the common pool
resource problems both by the state control and private institution. Dr. Ostrom
describes three influential models which are used as the foundation for
recommending state or market solutions for a small-scale Common Pool Resource.
Those three models are first, the tragedy of the commons, second, the
prisoner’s dilemma game, third, the logic of collective action. Garrett Hardin’s
‘the tragedy of the commons’ embodies the ruin of the environment comes when
individuals use a scarce resource in common. ‘The prisoner’s dilemma game’ elucidates
that the real users of resources certainly deplete them in absence of governance by higher
authority. Mancur Olson’s ‘The Logic of Collective Action’ describes it as
theory of collective inaction where she excludes the altruistic group not to be
proliferated.

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Neither the state nor the private agency have produced any solutions to
the common pool. Now, there is a challenge to develop theories of human
organization to deal the all aspects of tragedy of commons. Here, Ostrom lays
the theoretical and analytical framework to the Study of Self-Organization and Self-Governance
in CPR Situations. The term ‘common-pool resource’ refers to a natural or
man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but
not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from
its use”. It can be limited to access a CPR at the sane time to a single
individual or firm or to multiple individuals or teams of individuals who use
the resource system. Ostrom draws on experiences from successful CPR
institutions, the irrigation districts of Spain and Philippines and the
communal tenures of high mountain meadows and forests in Japan and Switzerland.
As example Ostrom cites the association of residents in the village of Torbel,
Switzerland. An association was established in 1483 to regulate the use of the
communal alp, wasteland, forests, paths and irrigation system. Ownership of
private land is closely correlated the right of access to the communal lands.
Ostrom gives examples of CPR in Switzerland villages about the problem of member’s
credible commitment and the problem of mutual monitoring, provision problems, two
essential ingredients for robust, enduring institutions. She analyses several
examples of fragilities and catastrophes of communal lands. The organization of
mountain grazing and forest CPRs in Switzerland and Japan and irrigation
systems in Spain and the Philippine Islands and other examples tells us that
the appropriators design basic operational rules, create organizations to
undertake the operational management of their CPRs, and modify their rules over
time in light of past experience according to their own collective-choice and
constitutional-choice rules and solution of commitment and mutual monitoring.

             
Despite turning of specific rules Ostrom turns to a set of seven design
principle to characterize all of the robust CPR institutions, plus an eighth
principle uses in the larger, more complex cases. These are as,

             
1. Clearly defined boundaries: There must be a clearly defined boundaries
of CPR itself and also for individuals or households who have rights to withdraw
resource units from the CPR.

             
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local
conditions: Appropriation rules restricting technology, time, place, and/or
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to facilitate
rules requiring labour, material, and/or money.

             
3. Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules by
themselves.

             
4. Monitoring: Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and
appropriator behaviour, are accountable to the appropriators or are the
appropriators.

             
5. Graduated sanctions: Depending on the seriousness and
context of the offense, appropriators who disrupt operational rules are likely
to be judged graduated sanctions by other appropriators, by officials
accountable to these appropriators, or by both.

             
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: The officials and
appropriators and have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve
conflicts among appropriators or between officials and appropriators.

             
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize: The rights of
appropriators to devise their own institutions without creating formal
governmental jurisdictions are not challenged by external governmental
authorities.

             
8. Nested enterprises: Provision, appropriation, enforcement, monitoring,
conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers
of nested enterprises. Rules should be established at one level considering
rules at the other levels to endure over the long run.

             
Robustness, self-governing institutions for managing complex CPR
situations which appropriators devises governance system and surviving for long
periods of time in environments often characterises by ambiguity and change. The
competitive pumping race in area of Los Angeles metropolitan or California
(water rights) or Raymond Basin (Litigation game) or West Basin negotiation or Central
Basin litigation  was overshadowed and
threatened until institutional changes were initiated by those affected. Developing
new institutions is subject to the same incentive and cooperative issues as are
the CPRs those institutions are intended to help resolve. The analysts need to
alter significantly the way they think about issues of supplying institution
like cases of groundwater basins which lead to suggest that the incremental, sequential,
and self-transforming process of institutional change. We need to rethink the role
and impact of these institutional rules having three deontic operators-forbid,
require, and permit. Therefore, it is necessary to examine net return of
staying with the status quo rules versus some type of change.

             
To determine the commonality of the instances of success, failure, and
fragility of various cases, the design principles need to consider some
situational and regime characteristics. Illustration of these cases help to
demonstrate the factors that can limit the capacity of individuals to change
institutions and develop viable self-governance for CPRs. Ostrom analyses these
cases from two different perspective. First, she compares the extant
institutions using the design principles, second, she analyses the regime and situational characteristics
that appear to affect the capacities of 

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